From Naming and Shaming to Negotiated Peace:
Civil War Duration and Media Coverage of Human Rights Violations

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Abstract
Violations of human rights in the context of a conflict have in recent years received an increasing amount of attention from the international media. Yet, how such media attention influences conflict remains unstudied and, a priori, uncertain. On the one hand, media coverage of human-rights abuses constitutes “naming and shaming” that might temper hostilities. On the other hand, such coverage might spark intransigence and complicate negotiations among conflicting parties, thereby hindering rather than hastening peace. This paper tries to adjudicate among these and other possibilities by exploring how human-rights promotion via media coverage influences the development of conflicts. The analysis reveals that naming and shaming in the media is associated with shorter conflicts and negotiated agreements between fighting parties, effects that are particularly strong among poorer countries, where rebel forces are strong, and where UN peacekeeping missions are in place.
The violation of human rights is a sad but frequent consequence of civil war, affecting millions of lives around the world. With the rise of mass media, people are now better informed than ever about atrocities as the stories and images of these are made public. This process has sometimes encouraged the international community (e.g. governments, international organizations) to intervene in domestic conflict, by pressuring the actors involved to improve human rights conditions (Lebovic and Voeten 2006). In more extreme cases, foreign powers (either unilaterally or collectively) have become involved militarily in countries ravaged by civil war, citing the avoidance of further violence and bloodshed as important motivations to do so (e.g. Kaufman 1996).

Despite the growing involvement of media and governments in protecting human rights in the context violent conflicts, we know little about how media attention affects the conflicts themselves. Recent scholarship has analyzed the effects of foreign interventions on conflict duration (e.g. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Elbadawi 2000; Regan 2002; DeRouen and Sobek 2004) and post-conflict stability (e.g. Fortna 2004; Fortna 2005), but little or no attention has been given to the effects of substantive human-rights demands often underlying these interventions. Furthermore, studies on the effects of human rights promotion by media and non-governmental organizations have focused on implications for actual violations of these rights (e.g. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Franklin 2008; Hafner-Burton 2008; Conrad and Moore 2010). But little theoretical or empirical connection has been established between these issues – attention to human rights violations on the one hand and duration of conflicts on the other.

This is an important silence in conflict research, because the media attention to human rights has potentially large, but also uncertain, implications for conflicts. Human rights promotion is seen by practitioners of conflict mediation as a way to support justice and to promote long-term peace, or at least to promote justice without worsening conflict. Intuition
and anecdotes suggest that such promotion can indeed embolden belligerent parties to make changes in human rights conditions that can serve to improve political legitimacy and stabilize social opposition in ways that promote peaceful transition. But mediation experiences also suggest that promotion of human rights can complicate negotiations to end hostilities or can spark intransigence among leaders who worry about post-conflict revenge for previous human rights abuses. The problem is that we lack systematic investigation to adjudicate between these plausible and competing implications of human rights promotion.

This paper attempts such adjudication by exploring whether and under what conditions media attention to human rights influences the duration and outcome of civil conflicts. We start by articulating arguments on how human-rights promotion by the international media has offsetting effects that in some ways can help resolve and in other ways exacerbate domestic conflict. We then test these competing views in an empirical analysis of 284 conflict dyads (government-rebel group) between 1975 and 2000, using an event-history framework and a range of alternative estimators and specifications to isolate the effects of media reporting on conflict, net of \textit{ex ante} human rights conditions and actual foreign interventions. This analysis yields evidence that naming and shaming by media has a pacifying effect where civil conflicts are ongoing, leading to peace by formal agreement between the central authority and rebels. Furthermore, our results suggest that human-rights promotion shortens conflict especially in poor countries, in countries where rebel groups are relatively strong, and where UN peacekeeping forces are present. Such findings extend our understanding of when and how interventions by outside actors can influence conflict: even ‘soft’ interventions in the form of naming and shaming of human rights violations can help shorten conflict and build peace.

\textbf{Human rights promotion and its implications for conflict}
Amidst violent conflict and the many abuses of human rights that often accompany such conflict, many third-party actors frequently seek to improve human rights conditions to establish political stability and justice in such settings. This applies to third-party nation states; to regional international political institutions like the European Union or the United Nations; to economic institutions like the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank; and to a great many non-governmental actors, from mediation organizations to human rights NGOs, to dispersed media and journalists-commentators. The tools these actors use in their promotion of human rights are as diverse as their membership – including symbolic or official political resolutions; legal political and economic conditionality and sanctions; and formal legal proceedings to prosecute and punish human rights violators. But they also include a more diffuse, or “softer,” tool of human-rights promotion: informational reporting and monitoring that track, that is “name and shame,” human rights abuses and abusers.

Such attention to human rights from the media has steadily increased over the past decades. Figure 1 depicts the annual number of reports by the international media, as measured by the number of relevant newspaper articles by the Economist and Newsweek. Clearly, there is a rising trend in such reporting. In 1975 each of these newspapers produced less than ten articles annually in which human rights violations were reported. At the end of the century their reporting increased more than tenfold, the Economist even citing violations 142 times in the year 2000.

[Figure 1 here]

The importance of these efforts are in the first instance their contributions to the development and protection of various kinds of human rights, from individual, to political to social rights – rights that feed into broader notions of justice, as well as more downstream and
real political stability and wellbeing. But such human rights promotion may also be relevant for its more indirect implications for conflict itself. Most intuitively, human-rights promotion calls attention to justice, stability and wellbeing that may nudge conflicting parties in ways that help quell conflicts. On the other hand, anecdotes abound of instances where human-rights promotion appears to complicate more than quell conflict – by taking bargaining chips off of negotiating tables, and by complicating already-tense and dense political confrontations.

Unfortunately, more systematic scholarly literatures on human rights and on violent conflict are of little help in judging how human-rights promotion affects conflict. They say plenty about related human rights development and about conflicts, but little about their interconnection. The literature focused on war termination says little about any aspects of human rights conditions affecting such termination (Goemans 2000), but the extensive literature on causes of war says plenty about how broad political and human rights conditions affect incidence of conflict. For instance, the enormous literature on “the democratic peace” explicitly discusses aspects of individual and political rights associated with democratic liberalism tend to promote peace, at least once such liberalism becomes institutionalized (Oneal and Russett 2002; Snyder and Mansfield 2000). There is also some insight into how social as opposed to political rights can matter to conflict, where absence of social rights appears to spur violence (Wang et.al.1993; <xxxx>). As for specifically individual or civil rights – such as free speech or protection from torture, rape, recruitment of child soldiers, etc. – the literature has focused mainly on how conflict affects such rights (Poe and Tate 1994; Thoms and Ron 2007). Missing from this litany of insight, in any event, are ideas about whether human-rights promotion shapes the incidence, duration, or intensity of armed conflict.

The literature most focused on such promotion, meanwhile, only glances at the edges
of how human-rights promotion might influence conflict. The literature on humanitarian intervention by governments and/or the UN or other peacekeeping missions identifies lessons about the conditions under which such interventions meaningfully save lives and promote stability (Seybolt 2009; Kuperman 2001; Doyle and Sambanis 2001; Regan 2002; Fortna 2004). But here the focus is on military interventions and occupations – rather than explicitly human rights-focused media pressure – help promote peace. The literature that does focus on the effects of diplomatic or economic pressure, meanwhile, has focused on effects for actual observance of human rights rather than conflict. For instance, we know plenty about the efficacy of UN and aid organizations for fighting corruption or violations of human rights (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007; Lebovic and Voeten 2006; <xxxxx>.), or about the effects of naming and shaming in the media and by NGOs in diminishing human rights violations (Franklin 2008; Ramos et.al.2007). But none of this knowledge tells us what human rights promotion means for violent conflicts.

Even the partial exceptions say more about (particular aspects of) violence rather than the incidence or duration of actual war. A recent study by Murdie and Bhasin (2011), for instance, discusses and empirically establishes a positive relationship between human rights INGO activities and domestic protest. And Krain (2012) finds a negative correlation between naming and shaming and state-sponsored mass murders, though his analysis focuses on violence events (mass murders) and covers only 29 events in 25 different countries. Finally, Poe and Tate (1994) study links between conflict and human rights, but do so by addressing the reverse to our current interest, finding a positive effect of civil conflict on the abuse of causally downstream human rights.

We are left, hence, with intuition and anecdote to judge whether and under what conditions promoting human rights helps conflict resolution. For what they are worth, intuition and anecdote, including those based on our own mediation experience, suggest that
promotion of human rights might hinder as well as help conflict resolution. We can briefly
inventory these diverse insights to motivate two broad and competing views and
accompanying hypotheses about how media attention to human rights violations affects
conflict.¹ We can then consider a range of further insights suggesting how the implications of
such attention for conflict might be mediated by the political and economic conditions
characterizing the conflict.

Direct effects of Media attention to human-rights violations for conflict

The first, intuitive view is that human rights promotion in general, and media-based
“naming and shaming” in particular, has a range of pacifying implications for conflict. First,
calling attention to human rights conditions and violations in a conflict setting can help
inspire conflicting parties privy to such promotion to make improvements in or feel deterred
from worsening human rights conditions, changes that often constitute intrinsic lowering of
violence but may also defuse and channel political discontents into peaceful interaction. Such
changes can, in turn, identify and remedy important root causes of conflict and can help
parties to a conflict, as well as mediating groups, to negotiate long-term political stability.

Second, promoting human rights can also contribute indirectly – short of actual
improvements in human rights – to a process of interaction within conflict settings that builds
peace. Human-rights promotion can, namely, invoke legal and ethical standards and rules that
are neutral in polarized political settings, and can protect those on both sides of a conflict
within conflict zones who are more likely to use their voice to foster political solutions when
human rights are being pushed. Such standards and rules could well facilitate the interaction
of conflicting parties to move towards peace.

Third and finally, promoting human rights can help foster confidence in building more
complicated peace settlements by encouraging other outside actors to commit economic, political and (neutral) military resources to build a peace process. Here the key agents connecting human-rights promotion to peacemaking are not the conflicting parties themselves but those outside observers able to use a range of means to promote peace among such parties. And those outside actors might be themselves more inclined to intervene in light of the media attention to human rights surrounding conflicts. And this intervention, or perhaps the threat of intervention, can in turn encourage peaceful accommodation in conflict settings.

These various implications add up to beneficence with respect to peacemaking. This pacifying consequence can be expected whether the human-rights promotion is undertaken by media organizations, NGOs, nation-states or international organizations, whether such promotion involves simple monitoring or naming-and-shaming or actual sanctions or interventions. And although such pacifying effects might apply particularly where media attention to human-rights violations is targeted at a particular kind of party to a conflict, or to a particular aspect of human rights, even more general, untargeted attention to any human-rights problems can be expected to shorten fighting and encourage peace. Combined, hence, we have the basis for a first general hypothesis about the direct implications of media naming and shaming:

**H1: Human rights promotion by international media should help hasten a negotiated end to conflicts.**

On the other hand, promoting human rights via naming and shaming or other means may well do more harm than good with respect to conflict. First, such promotion can bog down peace discussions where combatants are already asked to address many contentious issues underlying conflict – as it were raising the transaction costs of bargaining and negotiation towards the establishment or maintenance of peace. Second, human-rights
promotion by the media or other organizations can spark intransigence by one or another party, because one or both parties may: sense a loss of control over its future; may fear losing face or credibility in dealing with their own constituency or outside interlocutors; or may fear punishment that human rights improvements would entail (<xxx>; Mendeloff 2004). Third, human rights promotion can delegitimize the process of peace-building and negotiations, particularly the peacemaking efforts of outside (Western) actors, because ex ante human rights violations tend to be very one side such that attention to such violations can quickly seem like biased intervention, and because the values and rule-of-law standards within which human rights get championed can seem like imposed Western constructions.

By such logic, the promotion of human rights might well backfire, even if the beneficent effects emerge in the context of the same conflict settings. It is possible, hence, that the net effect for peacemaking is negative, or perverse. Such a possibility motivates a second hypothesis that directly contrasts the first:

\[ H2: \text{Human rights promotion by international media should lengthen rather than shorten conflicts.} \]

Of course, a number of other hypotheses about the direct effects of media naming-and-shaming could be articulated in light of the broad logics articulated above. The most obvious is that the offsetting implications of media attention can be expected to cancel one another out, such that such promotion has no significant net effects on peacemaking. Such a possibility constitutes a null hypothesis of our study.

\[ \text{Mediated effects of Human rights promotion on conflict} \]
Beyond such competing direct effects of naming and shaming for conflict termination, however, a range of political and economic conditions characterizing a conflict situation can be expected to alter or mediate how media attention to human rights might affect the duration of conflicts. We focus on three such conditions. First, established human rights violators might be less sensitive to human-rights promotion by outside actors than are those actors with relatively good human-rights records. Nations in which either governments and/or contesting parties or groups have particularly bad human rights records – that is, a long history of extensive, numerous and/or serious human rights violations – likely have a particularly bad reputation as such. Such a reputation, of course, can be expected to affect media attention and proxy for political actors in a conflict who are less primed to care about improving human rights. But one can also expect, net of such conditions, that worse actual human rights records can be expected to constitute a climate where media naming and shaming can be expected to fall on deaf ears or more readily spur intransigence in conflict resolution. We hypothesize, hence, the following:

_H3: More actual human-rights violation should make human-rights promotion by international media conflicts less likely to diminish and more likely to lengthen conflicts._

Secondly, more economically developed and wealthier countries can be expected to be less sensitive to outside critiques than are their poorer counterparts. In particular, poorer countries can be expected to be more dependent on external economic and political assistance than applies to wealthier settings. The economic side effects and costs of negative media attention to human-rights violations can, hence, be expected to be sharper at the margin for the conflicting parties. Conversely, the potential external economic and political benefits of responding to media or other external pressure can be expected to be stronger. This supports
a further observable hypothesis on what might mediate the efficacy of naming and shaming:

\[ H4: \text{Human rights promotion by international media should more readily shorten than lengthen conflicts in poorer settings than in wealthier settings.} \]

Furthermore, the naming-and-shaming of media coverage might have effects that are altered by the activity of other outside interventions, such as the presence of multilateral peacekeeping missions by the United Nations. In particular, such missions might not only be strengthened or inspired by media coverage; they might also make the coverage itself more meaningful or biting for conflicting parties or observers. In light of the competing hypotheses about the direct effects of media attention, this suggests that the presence of UN missions should enhance either the pacifying or exacerbating effects of such attention for conflict.

\[ H5: \text{Human rights promotion by international media should more readily shorten or lengthen conflicts in settings where a UN peacekeeping mission is in place.} \]

Finally, human-rights promotion via media coverage might also have implications mediated by characteristics of the conflicting parties. For instance, we might expect that different stages of a conflict might render the setting more or less ripe to influence from the outside. Or we might expect that the relative balance of power between the conflicting parties can influence their susceptibility to critiques from outside actors, including media-based naming and shaming. In particular, it may be that conflicts that have reached some kind of stalemate, and/or where rebels are as strong as governments in a given phase of conflict, might be particularly susceptible to human-rights promotion appeals, which in turn amplify the offsetting effects articulated above. That is, with stronger rebels and more even power
distributions in a conflict, human-rights promotion might have stronger implications for a
crime — more strongly fostering or more strongly complicating accommodation and
terrorism. This motivates our sixth and final hypothesis:

\textit{H6: Human rights promotion by international media should more readily shorten or lengthen}
\textit{conflicts in settings where power distributions between conflicting parties, such as rebels and
governments, are more equal.}

Our state of knowledge is preliminary enough, and our theoretical priors open enough,
that we consider such complexities as an inductive matter. Our analysis is most focused on
adjudicating the basic opposition between the Pacifying and the Perversity Hypotheses (H1
and H2, respectively). To the extent that we have the data to do so, however, we are, we
should explore not just whether but under what conditions human-rights promotion via media
naming and shaming help or hinder peacemaking.

\textbf{Estimating the effects of media attention to human rights on conflict duration}

There are many obstacles to a systematic study of human rights promotion and
conflict. Difficult inferential threats plague our understanding of how human rights
promotion, \textit{ceteris paribus}, affects conflict. Key among these threats is potential endogeneity
bias caused by omitted variables and by reversed causality. The former could well arise given
the difficulty of isolating the conflict consequences of human-rights promotion from actual
human rights conditions or other sources of both media attention and conflict; the latter can
emerge from the fact that the severity and duration of conflict not only reflects, but surely also
affects, human-rights promotion. Our empirical analysis, of course, must tackle these and
other inferential challenges.

In order to do so we analyze a large database of civil wars in a period from 1975 to 2000. The data for the dependent variable comes from the Uppsala/PRIOR Armed Conflict Database which has originally been collected by Gleditsch et al. (2002) and expanded with supplementary information on the non-state actors involved in the conflict by Cunningham et al (2009). The unit of observation is the dyad-duration in days, where the dyad represents a pairing of the government and an insurgent group. One conflict can thus contain different dyads, depending on the number of fighting parties involved. Such dyadic information is crucial for our analysis because we are interested in controlling for and testing the possible mediating effect of a number of conditions of the conflicting parties, not just the countries within which fighting takes place. A conflict, in the analysis, is coded when at least 25 deaths have been reported in a given dyad year. The database as used here contains 284 conflict dyads in 71 countries.

As our baseline analysis of these data, we estimate Cox semi-parametric proportional hazard models (see Cox 1972), wherein we assess the effects of our covariates on the hazard of a conflict coming to an end. The Cox model is chosen over a parametric model as we do not have a particular theory for the functional form of the underlying baseline hazard. A test of non-proportionality using Schoenfeld residuals indicates that the Cox model is appropriate for the data used in this study (see for a discussion Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, 2004). All analyses include robust standard errors clustered by conflict. In addition to such baseline analysis, we also consider a range of other specifications and estimators, including Instrumental Variable techniques to address possible endogeneity bias arising from omitted variable bias, simultaneity or measurement problems.

Independent variables
The data for media reporting on human rights violations come from Ramos et al. (2007). The variable used here is composed of the total annual number of newspaper articles in the Economist and Newsweek, citing violations of some sort in a given country. Although these data do not measure the details of human-rights violations – neither the identity of the violator or violated, nor the particular kind of human-rights violation – it does capture the broad publicly expressed attention to violations in a given polity. Applied, then, to polities riven by armed political conflict, the measure gauges explicit attention to all human rights violations, violators and their violated victims before, during and after active fighting. And this provides leverage to judge whether and under what conditions such broad attention affects such fighting.

By including both Economist and Newsweek sources we hope to present a reasonably representative and influential sample of international news coverage in the English language (see also Hafner-Burton 2008). To be sure, these sources are distinct in ways that may limit their representativeness: they are “only” English language; they are directly read by informed readerships; and they are weekly news magazines rather than newspapers. But both the Economist and Newsweek are widely enough read and influential enough among broad international readerships that they likely have direct influence on important actors in and surrounding conflicts, and they likely proxy for the “naming-and-shaming” by other media sources and NGOs, whose coverage can be expected to reach such actors.

The measures, in any event, provide the best systematic measures of attention to human rights violations with the coverage and substantive relevance to explore how media-based naming and shaming might influence conflicts. In any event, human rights violations were reported in the news, so measured, in just over 44% of our cases. Among those cases, the vast majority of countries were reported once or twice, while the maximum number of
reports amounted to 23, in Serbia in 1999.

**Control variables**

In order to effectively isolate the effect of media reporting on conflict from other factors plausibly relevant to both reporting and conflict, we consider a range of controls. A number of these controls, furthermore, are important as possible mediating conditions – factors altering the influence of media on conflict termination. The most obvious of such controls are *ex ante* human rights violations, conditions that surely influence both reporting and directly the existence and persistence of conflict. Following Lebovic and Voeten (2006), we employ the Political Terror Scales based on Amnesty International and U.S. State Department data (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). The scale consists of five levels, where a higher score corresponds to worse conditions. We have standardized the variable so that it ranges between 0 and 1.

A second crucial parameter that needs to be incorporated into the analysis concerns actual foreign military intervention. One of the ways in which naming and shaming by the media could affect the duration of conflict is by triggering the international community to intervene, but such intervention might also underlie media attention. And as discussed above, actual interventions may also alter or enhance the effects that media naming and shaming has on conflicts. Among international military inventions, the vast majority takes place under the flag of the United Nations (UN). Hence, we have developed a dichotomous variable (using UN data) that takes on the value of 1 if the United Nations has a *peacekeeping* or monitoring mission present in a particular country.

Furthermore, we need to account for a number of characteristics of the conflicts themselves. First of all, the duration of conflict is likely to be positively affected if rebels groups control a part of a country’s territory in a country at war. In order to account for this
effect, we include a dichotomous territorial control variable which indicates (on the level of the conflict dyad) if a rebel group has effective control over a territory. Also, we include a dummy variable containing information on whether a rebel group has a legal political wing, which provides for political means to continue negotiations during conflict. Furthermore, several studies have pointed towards the salience of ethnicity for conflict dynamics (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier et al. 2004; Fearon 2004). Following Cunningham et al. (2009) we control for potential effects of ethnicity in two ways: we include Fearon and Laitin’s ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (ELF), which depicts the likelihood that two randomly selected citizens belong to different ethnic groups; and we include whether a conflict can be classified as an ethnic conflict, given evidence that such conflict tends to last longer is more difficult to resolve. Most importantly, perhaps, we also want to control for and consider the mediating role of the relative strength of the combating parties to a conflict. This we do by considering the fighting strength of the rebel groups (relative to the military capabilities of the central government), accounted for by a strong and a parity dummy variable. Such is important given the evidence to suggest that such strongly-positioned rebels are successful at extracting concessions from the central authority, leading to shorter conflicts.

Finally, we consider the direct and mediating role of a number of broad contextual factors potentially relevant to human-rights reporting and conflict: democracy, GDP per capita and population. Democratic countries tend to be more politically stable than autocracies (see e.g. Olson 1993), even though democratizing states however tend to be less stable than either autocracies or established democracies. There is not much evidence on how these institutions perform during conflict, but one could argue that democracies provide more and better public services than non-democracies, reducing the ability of rebels to mobilize citizens for their cause. We include a dichotomous variable measuring whether a country is a democracy or not. GDP per capita (measured in constant 2000 US dollars) is a standard
measure for state capacity. Furthermore, the willingness of citizens to revolt decreases as they are wealthier (MacCullogh 2004). In order to reduce the impact of outliers, the natural logarithm of both variables is used. Finally, we control for the number of conflict dyads occurring in the same year in a given country, as different conflicts within each country are likely to influence one another.iii

Findings

The baseline results of the conflict-continuation regressions are presented in Table 1. Model 1 includes all conflict dyads in the database. We observe that media reports have a positive but insignificant effect on the hazard of conflict termination. When rebels are relatively strong militarily (being at least at parity with the government) and/or when they have a legal political wing of their organization, conflicts tend to end sooner rather than later. Conversely, democracies and countries in which rebels have effective control over a particular territory conflicts appear to witness longer conflicts. Yet, this does not tell us anything about how the conflict ends. Since we have hypothesized that media attention to human rights leads to reconciliation between fighting parties, we need to check if media attention leads to shorter conflicts through peaceful outcomes. Model 2 runs the same regression on a subsample of the data that includes only ongoing conflicts and conflicts ending in a formal agreement. About one quarter of all conflicts terminating in the sample period result in such an agreement (see also Table 2). Note that we keep all cases of ongoing conflict in the analysis, as we do not know how conflicts will end when they are still ongoing. In the robustness section we include a model that only analyzes the effects of media reporting on conflicts eventually ending in peace.
In this restricted model, media attention has a stronger (now significant) positive effect on the hazard of conflict termination. The relationship persists (and is even enhanced) when we add actual human rights violations (model 3) and UN interventions to the model (model 4). Human rights violations seem to have no independent effect on conflict, but UN peacekeeping missions increase the hazard of conflict termination. Interestingly, the two variables sustaining conflict in model 1 lose their impact once we exclude all conflict outcomes other than formal agreement from the analysis. In fact, ethnic conflict persists as a significant explanatory variable (contrary to for example Regan 2002 and Collier et al. 2004; yet Fearon 2004 finds no significant effect), while larger countries tend to witness longer conflicts. The observation that relatively strong rebels are no longer significant in this model could suggest that their pacifying effect is actually captured by peacekeeping missions that intervene in conflicts where rebels have a chance to prolong fighting.

In order to interpret the substantive effect of the main variable of interest in model 4, namely media reporting, we can take the exponentiated coefficient, thereby gauging the change of the hazard rate for a 1-unit change in this covariate (Cleves et al. 2008). The coefficient of 0.120 corresponds to a change in the hazard rate of 1.13. In other words, a increase of one report by either the Economist or Newsweek citing human rights violations in a country at war increases the hazard of conflict termination by 13%. Figure 2 shows the different (predicted) survival rates for conflict years in which 5 media reports were written compared to conflict years in which no reports were written. The former has a 50 % survival probability after less than 5,000 conflict days, whereas the latter passes this threshold only after more than 7,000 days. As such, media reporting on human rights violations corresponds
to considerably shorter conflicts.

[Figure 2 here]

In order to assess potential conditional effects of human rights promotion by media on conflict (as we have articulated in the theoretical discussion), we have specified four models including a range of interaction terms (see Table 3). Note that these models analyze the full sample of conflict dyads, including all types of conflict termination. Model 5 demonstrates that media attention is mediated by per capita income to the extent that its pacifying effects are much stronger in poorer than wealthier countries. As argued in the theoretical section of this paper, media attention to human rights violations could harden the position of governments engaged in armed struggle, but one could argue that a government has less to fear from the international repercussions of naming and shaming in the media if they are economically stronger and thereby less dependent on international support.

[Table 3 here]

There appears to be no conditional effect of human rights promotion on conflict duration for different levels of actual human rights violations. Model 6 renders an insignificant interaction term. Still, the results in model 7 suggest that Media reporting on human rights violations is more effective at shortening conflict if a UN peacekeeping mission is present in a particular country. As stated above, media attention can push fighting parties to reach a peace agreement. An international military presence can act as a credible commitment of the international community to support peace, thereby exerting a catalyzing effect on the peace process. This dynamic can also make the importance of media attention to human rights
more meaningful to conflict parties and outside mediators – enhancing the bite or effectiveness of such reporting. One can think of the example of the Yugoslav War in the early 1990s, during which the UN presence reminded the fighting militias that the international community was watching closely. Even though it was not successful at preventing atrocities from happening altogether, the peacekeeping operation arguably helped speed up negotiations towards a peace settlement.

Model 8 allows us to gauge the effect of media reporting conditional on rebel strength. International media attention to conflict can trigger behavior from rebels. For example, rebels may be inclined to continue fighting when atrocities committed by government forces are being spelled out in foreign media. By stepping up resistance against a regime which is being named and shamed, rebels can signal to the international community that they are a forceful and credible opponent in order to gain international support for their cause, which in turn increases their chances of victory. Alternatively, when rebels themselves commit atrocities against noncombatants and these make it to the international media, rebel leaders could respond by increasing violence so as to demonstrate their power to the government and the international community. In either way, media attention to human rights violations can serve as a stimulus for rebels to bolster their violent activities. Given the existing evidence that governments are rarely successful in cracking down on strong rebels, this will often result in governments accommodating rebel demands.

Robustness

In order to assess the sensitivity of the baseline model, we have run a range of sensitivity tests. Table 4 presents three of these. Potential endogeneity of media reporting poses a source of particular concern. There are three ways in which this bias may affect our results: bias caused by measurement error, omitted variable bias, and simultaneity bias (Wooldridge 2002:...
Perhaps he most obvious of these is simultaneity bias: conflict oftentimes gives rise to media attention, and as one could also expect some underlying factors in a particular conflict to affect reporting on human rights violations as well as the conflict itself. Ceteris paribus, the world’s bloodiest wars tend also to attract the most media attention. Yet, if our explanatory variable suffered from endogeneity bias due to such simultaneity, it should lead to a negative exaggeration of the media reporting coefficient. We should therefore be careful not to interpret a negative coefficient of media reporting on conflict duration with too much confidence. The baseline models, however, indicate a positive and significant relationship. In other words, that media attention shows up in our models as having a pacifying effect on conflict tempers our concern about the ultimate salience of endogeneity – at least through simultaneity bias.

Nevertheless, we have explored the robustness of the reported results to instrumental variable models using different sets of instruments. To meet the orthogonality criteria of such an analysis, an instrumental variable (or variables) needs to be exogenous (uncorrelated to the error term) to the specified model and be highly correlated with the downstream endogenous variable (Wooldridge 2002: 84-86). In other words, a good instrument should influence the dependent variable only if it does so via the endogenous variable. Beyond empirical patterns fitting such criteria, we also need instruments to have a plausible theoretical basis (Sovey and Green 2011). We propose two instruments: distance and affinity voting with US in the UN assembly. As such, we use a variable counting the physical distance of the country from the United Kingdom, and the United States in order to capture the attention and accessibility for the main English language media. These variables are plausible excluded variables, as there is little reason to believe that these factors affect conflict duration directly or through any of the other independent variables. The voting affinity in the UN assembly of a country with the United States of America (Voeten and Merdanovic 2009) tells us something about the extent
to which English-language mass media follow domestic politics of a country, however the
general voting behavior of a country in the UN Assembly should not affect the length of a
civil war. We added all instrumental variables to the baseline model. None of the instruments
turned out to be significant, but they do perform strongly when included in a first stage
regression estimating media reporting.\textsuperscript{iv}

Model 9 presents the second stage results of a two stage least squares instrumental
variable estimation (with bootstrapped standard errors). The instrumented media variable is
positive and significant, suggesting that after controlling for possible endogeneity, media
attention to human rights violations increases the hazard of conflict termination. Also in line
with our expectations about the direction of any possible endogeneity bias in the baseline
models, the IV models’ coefficient for media reporting is larger than the original variable in
model 4. The IV models, hence, strengthen our confidence in the original result, as we now
have little reason to fear that this coefficient is exaggerated in a positive direction. Most of the
other explanatory variables in the model show a similar sign and strength as in model 4.

[Table 4 here]

In model 10 we have excluded all left-censored conflicts, being all conflicts which
started before 1975 and for which we do not have data on our explanatory variable for these
years. Including these conflicts could thus bias the results. Despite a sizeable drop in the
number of observations vis-à-vis the baseline regression, this model shows by and large the
same results. As a third sensitivity analysis (see model 11), we have restricted the sample of
the baseline regressions to include only those conflicts ending in a formal agreement. In this
way, we intend to overcome the bias caused by conflicts that are ongoing but are moving
towards a different outcome, such as a rebel or government victory. By running the restricted
sample, we can reduce a potential source of omitted variable bias in the baseline model. Having said this, the results are largely the same.

We have also employed alternative estimators. In model 12 we have re-estimated the baseline model using a parametric Weibull regression, yielding results are very similar to those of the baseline model. This then corroborates the finding of a positive effect of media on the probability of conflict termination. Finally, we have specified a multinomial model in order to assess the effects of media reporting on conflict outcome as we have expressed expectations about specific scenarios. The ACD database identifies four different types of outcome (see also Table 2). Following Cunningham et al. (2009), we exclude coups (which tend to result in very short conflicts) and all cases of conflict taking place outside a country’s core territory (almost exclusively colonial wars). Given the theoretical and econometric motivations to do so, we use the instrumented version of media reporting in this model.

Table 5 presents the results from the multinomial regression model. In line with our previous findings, that Table’s model 13 reveals that media reporting increases the likelihood of conflict termination by formal agreement. In line with our expectations, efforts by the media to target human right violations on aggregate drive governments and rebel groups to the negotiation table. The effect is robust against different specifications. All other outcomes cannot be related to media reporting in a statistically significant way. An interesting result comes out of this model: UN peacekeeping operations increase the probability that a conflict ends in a formal agreement or a victory for the government, thus providing a clear advantage for governments over their challengers.

Conclusion
These patterns underscore our view that media attention to human rights violations under many conditions fosters shorter spells of conflict and peace through agreement. This view has emerged against the backdrop of our recognition that attention to human rights violations in the context of civil contexts can have both pacifying and perverse effects on such conflicts. On the one hand, focusing on human rights may foster stability and cooperation by defusing political discontent and stimulating peaceful interaction. On the other hand, highlighting abuse and violation of rights in the media may deter combatants and/or governments from striking a peace deal in the prospect of future legal prosecution. So even though the protection of human rights is widely considered to be an essential aspect of a just world, it may stand in the way of creating a peaceful one.

Our empirical analysis shows conditional and qualified support for the former of these views. In the net, “naming and shaming” by international media increase the probability of civil war termination by formal agreement. More generally, media attention shortens conflict (irrespective of the outcome) in poor countries, in countries where a UN peacekeeping force is present, and in conflicts where rebels are relatively strong. These results hold once we take account of and control for endogeneity, suggesting that if anything we may be underestimating the pacifying effects of media-based naming and shaming. In short, we have quite strong evidence that countries on which reports were written witnessed shorter conflicts, and we find no evidence that media attention prolongs conflict.

Although we consider such findings theoretically and empirically important, further research is necessary to draw stronger and more nuanced inferences on the relationship between human rights promotion and conflict. A major limitation in our analysis is that data on media reports is limited in terms of depth and content. Future research on this topic could benefit from better information in order to capture variation in different regions, kinds of conflicts, time periods, and different cases of human rights violations. Such data could be
much more detailed on a temporal scale, matching the detail of daily civil war data. In this way, we can learn more about how human rights promotion can facilitate rather than undermine conflict resolution.

In the meantime, our exploration of the best existing data suggests a finding of clear interest to students and practitioners of conflict. With respect to recent civil conflicts and for at least one important kind of human-rights promotion – the naming and shaming activity of media coverage of human rights abuses – outside human rights promotion appears to promote more than complicate peacemaking.

References


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Thoms, Oskar N.T. and James Ron. 2007. “Do Human Rights Violations Cause Internal
Conflict?,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 29: 674-705.

Voeten, Erik, and Merdzanovic, Adis. 2009 “United Nations General Assembly Voting Data”, http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/12379 UNF:3:Hpf6qDdzzvXF9m66yLTg== V1


From Naming and Shaming to Negotiated Peace: Civil War Duration and Media Coverage of Human Rights Violations

Tables & Figures

Table 1: Cox Proportional Hazards Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media reporting</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.078**</td>
<td>0.096*</td>
<td>0.120**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights violations</td>
<td>-0.435</td>
<td>-0.483</td>
<td>(0.673)</td>
<td>(0.642)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN peacekeeping</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.976***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.550)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial control</td>
<td>-0.562***</td>
<td>-0.277</td>
<td>-0.433</td>
<td>-0.583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.180)</td>
<td>(0.355)</td>
<td>(0.386)</td>
<td>(0.391)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebels Strong/Parity</td>
<td>0.974***</td>
<td>1.054**</td>
<td>1.250**</td>
<td>0.713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.201)</td>
<td>(0.429)</td>
<td>(0.494)</td>
<td>(0.514)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal political wing</td>
<td>0.611**</td>
<td>0.479</td>
<td>0.338</td>
<td>-0.195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.262)</td>
<td>(0.592)</td>
<td>(0.663)</td>
<td>(0.725)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-linguistic fractionalization</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.353)</td>
<td>(0.908)</td>
<td>(0.906)</td>
<td>(0.947)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic war</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>1.049***</td>
<td>0.926**</td>
<td>0.930**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.189)</td>
<td>(0.384)</td>
<td>(0.399)</td>
<td>(0.393)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td>(0.249)</td>
<td>(0.265)</td>
<td>(0.313)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-1.141***</td>
<td>-0.757</td>
<td>-0.764</td>
<td>-0.501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.330)</td>
<td>(0.648)</td>
<td>(0.682)</td>
<td>(0.718)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>-0.447**</td>
<td>-0.417**</td>
<td>-0.310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.197)</td>
<td>(0.207)</td>
<td>(0.222)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>1,228</td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>1,191</td>
</tr>
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<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-852.3</td>
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<td>-179.0</td>
<td>-170.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chi-squared</td>
<td>64.06</td>
<td>32.57</td>
<td>22.76</td>
<td>53.97</td>
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</table>

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 2. Conflict outcomes at termination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict outcome</th>
<th>Number of observations</th>
<th>Percentage of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal agreement</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government victory</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel victory</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low activity, other</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>100</td>
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</table>

Table 3. Cox Proportional Hazard Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media x GDP per capita</td>
<td>-0.127***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media x Human rights violations</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.195)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table 4. Robustness (Baseline)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
<th>Model 10</th>
<th>Model 11</th>
<th>Model 12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV-2SLS</td>
<td>Conflicts</td>
<td>Agreements</td>
<td>Parametric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>started after</td>
<td>only</td>
<td>Weibull</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Reporting</td>
<td>0.127**</td>
<td>0.086*</td>
<td>0.105**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media reporting ( prediction)</td>
<td>0.664**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.337)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights Violation</td>
<td>-1.478</td>
<td>-0.906</td>
<td>-0.337</td>
<td>-0.649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.919)</td>
<td>(0.973)</td>
<td>(0.597)</td>
<td>(0.783)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Peacekeeping</td>
<td>2.263***</td>
<td>1.775***</td>
<td>1.629***</td>
<td>1.673***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.629)</td>
<td>(0.521)</td>
<td>(0.556)</td>
<td>(0.483)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Control</td>
<td>-0.667</td>
<td>-0.163</td>
<td>-0.905**</td>
<td>-0.307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.493)</td>
<td>(0.437)</td>
<td>(0.456)</td>
<td>(0.375)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Formal Agreement</th>
<th>Government Victory</th>
<th>Rebel Victory</th>
<th>Low Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media reporting (prediction)</td>
<td>0.614* (0.332)</td>
<td>-0.012 (0.318)</td>
<td>0.378 (1.005)</td>
<td>0.266 (0.369)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights violations</td>
<td>-1.449 (1.046)</td>
<td>0.763 (1.701)</td>
<td>0.046 (1.990)</td>
<td>-0.361 (0.818)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Peacekeeping operations</td>
<td>2.201*** (0.602)</td>
<td>2.517*** (0.759)</td>
<td>-1.116 (1.255)</td>
<td>-0.142 (0.785)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Control</td>
<td>-0.286 (0.362)</td>
<td>-0.102 (0.583)</td>
<td>-0.780* (0.448)</td>
<td>-1.177*** (0.326)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebels strong/parity</td>
<td>-0.111 (0.568)</td>
<td>0.275 (0.864)</td>
<td>1.704*** (0.568)</td>
<td>-0.105 (0.625)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal political wing</td>
<td>-0.586 (0.748)</td>
<td>0.065 (0.614)</td>
<td>1.409* (0.722)</td>
<td>0.425 (0.440)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnolinguistic fractionalization</td>
<td>0.644 (1.030)</td>
<td>-2.178** (1.041)</td>
<td>-1.481 (1.384)</td>
<td>1.210 (0.963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic conflict</td>
<td>1.107*** (0.409)</td>
<td>0.101 (0.553)</td>
<td>-1.718** (0.758)</td>
<td>0.419 (0.371)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>-0.427 (0.414)</td>
<td>0.428 (0.536)</td>
<td>-1.870* (1.064)</td>
<td>-0.238 (0.382)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-0.131 (0.712)</td>
<td>-2.073** (1.050)</td>
<td>-13.428*** (0.793)</td>
<td>-1.250*** (0.476)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>-0.490** (0.206)</td>
<td>0.355 (0.265)</td>
<td>-0.335 (0.269)</td>
<td>-0.008 (0.182)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5. Robustness (Multinomial Logit)
Model 13
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time at state</th>
<th>-0.125</th>
<th>-0.551***</th>
<th>-0.103</th>
<th>-0.113*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.095</td>
<td>-6.700</td>
<td>14.357</td>
<td>-0.591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5.090)</td>
<td>(6.340)</td>
<td>(9.426)</td>
<td>(3.917)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>1,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-638.6</td>
<td>-638.6</td>
<td>-638.6</td>
<td>-638.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-squared</td>
<td>2252</td>
<td>2252</td>
<td>2252</td>
<td>2252</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses

Figure 1. Media Reporting on Human Rights Violations 1975-2000

![Annual Reporting of Human Rights Violations](image)

Figure 2. Comparing survival rate of different levels of media reporting
The following arguments about how human-rights promotion can defuse or exacerbate conflict draw on <xxxxxxx>, which provides fuller discussion of anecdotal evidence supporting those arguments.

The period of analysis is limited by the availability of the data on media reporting.

We have also included variables accounting for conflicts in neighboring countries as a test for robustness in order to control for transnational interdependence of conflict, but these variables tended to produce weak and insignificant results. For reasons of parsimony we have therefore omitted them from the main tables.

A Poisson specification is used in the first stage because “media reports” is a nonnegative count variable. A joint F-test of all excluded instruments is 76.91, well above the threshold of 10 suggested by Sovey and Green (2011).

A re-estimation using the original media variable provides somewhat weaker results on the covariates, but upholds the main effect.

DeRouen and Sobek (2004) find a similar result, even though they are using a different database (Doyle and Sambanis 2000).